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Much attention has recently focused on the lease of land throughout the global south to nations and corporations in the global north. It is argued that local people’s access to and relationships with the land are being redefined and that large segments of these populations are being denied their rights to land with potentially detrimental effects for their livelihoods and food security. This paper presents one such case – that of a 40,000 hectare bio-energy project in rural Sierra Leone – focusing specifically on the local experiences of rural women. As the paper shows, among the women interviewed the project is seen as something beyond their influence; as disempowering and disruptive. While Sierra Leonean women may have the formal right to participate in land decisions, in this case they had no such rights in practice. As a result, they are disempowered by this process of “development.” However, I argue here that this outcome is not the intention of the bio-energy company, nor of the government of Sierra Leone, but the result of compound disempowerment resulting from the complex interaction of indigenous social and cultural dynamics and the supposedly universal logic of liberal economics.  
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Introduction
Over the past few years there has been rising public interest in land acquisitions throughout the developing world. The mass media has repeatedly focused attention on such deals (Guardian 2009; Economist 2011; Volkskrant 2011; BBC 2012; New York Times 2013; Think Africa Press 2014), while civil society organizations have produced dozens of reports on the apparent negative results of such land acquisitions throughout the global south by nations and corporations from the global north (Grain 2008; Kugelman and Levenstein 2009; Cotula 2011; Baxter 2011; Ardenti 2011; Mosley 2012).  As will be discussed below, the topic has also received much academic attention with the publication of articles, books, special issues of scholarly journals, and the establishment of significant research programs and networks to further study the topic. 
This attention is in response to the apparently increasing prevalence of such land-deals driven by  a complex array of factors such as unstable (but generally increasing) food and fuel prices, changing patterns of consumption throughout the developing world, and the uncertainties of climate change (for more detailed analysis see Zoomers 2010; Oya 2013; Doss et al. 2014a). These trends have, on the one hand, convinced many wealthy states with significant concerns about their own long-term food security that “unused” land is an untapped resource (Verma 2014: 64), while also inspiring private corporations to see land exploitation (and often simply land control) as a source of future profits (De Schutter 2011: 253; Ossome 2014: 159). Although this acquisition process has been occurring throughout Africa, Asia, and Latin-America (Zoomers 2011), it has been claimed that “almost three-fourths of the world’s recent ‘land grabs’ have occurred in sub-Saharan Africa” (Sparks 2012: 687). 
This concentration of land acquisitions is particularly concerning for scholars of human rights as Africa is both the site of a significant number of the world’s most persistent conflicts and of the majority of its weak states (Englebert and Tull 2008; Branch and Cheeseman 2008; Howard 2012; The Fund for Peace 2012). The weakness of many African states emerging from periods of instability or outright violence means they are both more open to manipulation by powerful international actors (Barnett 2006: 88), and unable – or perhaps unwilling – to protect the rights of their own citizens (De Schutter 2011: 265). While many global forces (both governmental and corporate), are therefore allowing various actors to access and control African land, important questions remain regarding a) the beneficial vs. maleficent socio-economic impacts of such projects on local individuals and communities, and b) the appropriate methodologies by which to asses these various impacts (Oya 2013).
This article responds to these questions by presenting data from a grounded study of one such project with a specific focus on the experiences of local women. The impacts of such projects on the rights and wellbeing of women are of particular concern in such contexts as women are already marginalized within rural African society (Tsikata 2009: 13) and are therefore more vulnerable to being excluded from land use decisions when liberalization spurs external expropriation and restricts the amount of land available for use (Verma 2014: 58). As such, any discussion of the gendered impact of such land-acquisitions must be situated within “the broader context of capitalist transformations and two decades of neo-liberal economic policies in developing countries” (Tsikata 2009: 15). 
Specifically, this paper examines the gendered experience of a 40,000 hectare bio-energy project in rural Sierra Leone, funded by a consortium of seven development banks, and operated by a Swiss-based multinational corporation. Over the course of six months in 2012 I conducted 55 semi-structured interviews throughout the land-lease area of this project. Almost half of these interviews were with women – young and old, wives and mothers, members of landowning and ‘stranger’ families – and the paper presents their experiences of this project. Echoing other recent findings (Behrman et al. 2012; Doss et al. 2014a), the data collected demonstrates that the local experience of this project is highly gendered. While the women interviewed have had varying experiences – including beneficial, neutral and negative socio-economic impacts – all report being excluded from initial decisions regarding acceptance or rejection of the project and later decisions regarding the use of land payments. As such, these women uniformly describe being disempowered by the highly unequal norms of authority in northern Sierra Leone, only further compounded by the arrival of the new project.
The paper proceeds in four parts. First I review the literature regarding the new wave of large-scale land acquisitions and relate this to the literature on post-conflict weak states and human rights protection and the often voiced need for postwar gender empowerment. In part two, I provide an overview of this particular case and a brief description of my primary research questions and methodology. Part three presents the voices of the women living in villages within the land-lease area that describe their marginalized position vis-à-vis the decisions regarding the project and its cash benefits and the interaction between local socio-cultural dynamics and the imported liberal economic logics that result in a new and compound disempowerment within the project area. In part four I provide a brief summary of the argument and conclude by providing some initial ideas for overcoming this challenge, focusing specifically on the need for greater humility in our interventions, more knowledge of local context, and approaches to directly empower women themselves instead of those we imagine to be their defenders. 

Land, Liberalization and Gendered Disempowerment
As noted above, there has recently been a significant amount of academic attention paid to the phenomenon of land acquisitions by powerful actors from the global north within the states of the global south. This has included conferences exploring the issue of land rights and acquisitions at both the University of Sussex and Cornell University, and a number of research programs and networks designed to explore these problems, including the Agrarian Justice program at the Transnational Institute and the Land Governance for Equitable and Sustainable Development Program in the Netherlands.  
In addition, scholars have produced publications describing the prime causes of these new land acquisitions (Zoomers 2010), the common structure and framework of such deals (Cotula 2011), the negative aspects of these processes regarding local food security (GRAIN 2011), processes of consultation with or consideration for local actors (Vermeulen and Cotula 2010: Li 2011), the debate regarding land acquisitions as a form of development (Robertson and Pinstrup-Anderson 2010; Lavers 2012), the differences between apparent cases of land grabs (Kugelman and Levenstein 2009; Zoomers 2011; Cotula et al. 2011; Borrass and Franco 2012), and the phenomenon of ‘land-grabbing’ throughout Africa more generally (Cotula and Vermueulen 2009; Parulkar 2011; Sparks 2012; Oya 2013a; Baglioni and Gibbon 2013). Further, recent special issues of scholarly journals specifically address the issues of governance (Margulis et al. 2013; Wolford et al. 2013), “water grabbing” (Woodhouse and Ganho 2011; Mehta et al. 2012), Biofuels (Borras et al. 2010; White 2010); “green grabbing” (Fairhead et al. 2012), and capital and corporate accumulation (White et al. 2012).
While noting that the dynamics of the current “land rush” are more complicated than originally postulated, these contributions nonetheless confirm that something important is happening (Edelman et al. 2013: 1520). Land-acquisitions are on the rise, driven by a complex of global dynamics which have little chance of abating in the near future. Vast tracts of land are being leased to foreign actors both governmental and corporate, and for as much as 99 years. Such projects produce primarily for export to the home states of those funding these leases (Spieldock and Murphy 2009: 44; Doss et al. 2014a: 2), and rarely include any clear guidelines on export limits, even where food crops are concerned (Cotula and Vermeulen 2009: 1244). In fact, host states often incentivize exports by lowering tariffs, thus lowering the barriers to food crop export in order to attract Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) (Robertson and Pinstrup-Anderson 2010: 1273). As Parulkar has argued, in such deals “the investors call the shots – dictating the nature, scale and implementation of projects” (2011: 106). 
Such processes, whereby African governments attract foreign investment in large-scale agriculture for the purpose of modernization and expansion of the domestic tax base, have become increasingly common (Sesay, 2009; Woodhouse and Ganho, 2011: 3; Bagliani and Gibbon 2013: 1562-3; Wolford et al. 2013: 198). This is consistent with structural adjustment and free market approaches to development as championed by the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund throughout the 1980s (Rodrik 1990), but even more so with neoliberal economic policies that have been enforced throughout Africa since the end of the Cold War (Owusu 2003; Sewpaul 2005; Bond 2006; Ferguson 2006; Ossome 2014: 172). Such approaches are enforced further still in contexts of post-conflict transition characterized, almost invariably in sub-Saharan African contexts, by extremely weak states and massive international intervention dominated by the liberal peace paradigm. 
This approach has become dominant in the past 20 years in response to claims that intra-state conflicts are economically, as opposed to politically, motivated (Collier 2000; Collier & Hoeffler 1998), concerns regarding “resource wars” (Ross 2004; Fearon 2005), and scholarly work arguing that access to global markets have created additional avenues for funding civil war processes in the post-Cold War world (Kaldor 1999; Duffield 2001; Keen 1998; Reno 1997, 2002). These theories have inspired repeated calls for economic reforms, anti-corruption measures, controls over the resource exports, and sustainable economic development in general to be incorporated into peacebuilding (Ballentine and Nitzschke 2005a, 2005b; Pugh 2005; Nitzschke & Studdard 2005). Some scholars even argue that a sustainable peace is not only facilitated by but dependent upon capitalist economic development (Addison 2001; Li & Resnick 2003); demanding, therefore, the opening up of postwar states to FDI and the liberalization of postwar economies. As a result, economic liberalization has been seen as central to stabilizing African postwar contexts over the past two decades.
But such neoliberal approaches can have gendered effects on the ground. As described by Tsikata, women’s claims to and access to land are already weakened by “the physical and social demands of child-bearing and -rearing, the hetero-normativity, pro-natalism, and male-child preference” in most African societies (2009: 14). In the process of liberal privatization, already empowered groups “are able to strengthen their control over land to the detriment of women and some minority groups” (Lastarria-Cornhiel 1997: 1318) and so these “patriarchal discourses and norms are further entrenched” (Verma 2014: 58). It is widely recognized, therefore, that land concentration in the wake of neoliberal land reforms negatively affects women (Izumi 1999: 10; Peters 2004: 292: Tsikata 2009: 16; Amanor-Wilks 2009: 35; Behrman et al. 2012; Wisborg 2014: 28) - a special issue of Feminist Economics was recently examined this specific issue (Doss et al. 2014a). Broadly the central concern is that such policies lead to increasing competition for ever less available amounts of ever more valuable land (Daley and Pallas 2014; Peters 2004: 291-292; Doss et al. 2014b: 77; Ossome 2014: 161), and women’s marginalized status leaves them less equipped to compete in the tightening marketplace.  
	In this context, Sewpaul argues that, while globalization is “presented as a value free and neutral process” the dominant “neoliberal capitalist orientation” of this globalization “has its most profound effects on women and children in developing countries” (2005: 104-105). Izumi too notes that the assumed neutrality of “the logic of the market” and its indifference to “issues of equity” only further undermines the power of women within both formal and informal land tenure systems (1999: 9). She argues that “in the process of privatization, women are losing some rights which they held under indigenous tenure” (1999: 12), while the new formal legal tenure system has proven unable to “unsure women’s rights to land” (1999: 15; see also Daley 2014: 183). Importantly for the case studied here, Amanor-Wilks argues, for the case of Ghana, that “the impact of these trends on women is likely to increase” as European companies increase their growth of bio-fuels (2009: 36).  This article builds on these insights, with a specific focus on the gendered impacts of a large bio-energy project in rural Sierra Leone.

The Bio-Energy Project: Research Setting, Questions, and Methods
Following the liberal peacebuilding model, Sierra Leone’s post-conflict governments have worked to attract foreign companies, diversify exports, create jobs, and increase the state’s tax revenues. The Bio-energy project described here is one result of these attempts. The project design includes approximately 10,000 hectares of sugar cane planted in circular fields called ‘pivots’. Each of these pivots is surrounded by a wide dirt road and a network of new or much widened roads have been constructed to facilitate the movement of company machinery. However, this design means that much of the approximately 40,000 hectares leased will not be directly used and there have been no houses or villages physically relocated from the area. During my visit in 2012, therefore, approximately 30,000 people remained living in as many as 90 villages within the land-lease area. However, as the project does require the construction of major roads, pipelines, pump-stations and pivots, the farmland of many families and villages has been relocated. 
In exchange for this obvious disruption, the project claims that it will provide about 2000 permanent jobs for local workers when fully operational, the sale of 15 megawatts of power to the national power grid, and the provision of rice to affected communities for the first three years of the project. This rice will be grown on newly assigned plots of approximately 0.14 hectares per person assigned to each village, and after these three years the villagers will then grow their own rice on this land. In addition, the company is paying $5 per acre annually for the land that is leased, $3.20 of which is paid to the land-owning families, 72 cents to the chiefdoms involved, 72 cents to the district, and 36 cents to the national government. The company claims that in salaries, lease payments, and sub-contracting there will be some $3 million dollars circulated annually into the local economy.  Both the government and the company argue, therefore, that developments related to the project will sustainably improve employment opportunities, living standards, and food security within the project’s land-lease area. It was to test these claims that I designed and planned my research, which started with six months of fieldwork between April and September 2012.  
My primary research questions were very simple. What is the company doing on the ground? Is the project actually providing all of these claimed benefits? Have local people been fully informed about and consulted regarding the project; i.e. do they understand it? How are local people within the project area experiencing the project? How are the benefits of the project being distributed in the area – between villages, families, genders, and generations? And do such projects hold promise for peace in Sierra Leone, or might they be disruptive? These questions are broad in scope but specific to this context. They do not, therefore, address questions regarding the scope of the global land rush and the exact hectares leased in various countries or regions. 
As such, although the project was designed in 2011 and at somewhat of a distance from the recent explosion of “land rush” literature, the data talks directly to the methodological debates within that literature (see Scoones et al. 2013). Most specifically it responds to calls for more rigorous analysis of socio-economic impacts (Oya 2013a), “more nuanced empirical research” (Borras and Franco 2014: 1740), and more rigorous case studies (Edelman 2013: 498) focusing on the “differential effect” of land-deals on men and women (Behrman et al. 2012: 72). All of which this article attempts to provide. In addition, I have recently presented and defended an “ethnographic approach” to evaluating international interventions of various kinds in transitional states (AUTHOR 2014a), and believe this contribution will push forward this debate significantly. It was this approach I followed during my 2012 fieldwork. 
The research is designed to be implemented over the five years between 2012 and 2016, with additional waves of data to be collected annually among the community members within the project area. The data presented here is only from the first six months of fieldwork. In the first step of this project I began working with the company itself on their own Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) process in April of 2012. This had been prearranged with the company’s executives in Switzerland and a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) had been drafted and approved by their lawyers which outlined my provision of consulting on their social and economic impact assessment in exchange for access to the M&E data as well as to any personnel on site for interviewing purposes. During the first six weeks, therefore, I had access to the company offices, visited many of the project sites, and witnessed many of the processes the company uses to communicate with and “sensitize” local communities. However, the in-country management team refused to sign the previously drafted MoU and, given a firm request for me to leave at the start of June – due to my having identified weaknesses in their M&E process and my refusal to agree to publish nothing that might “harm the reputation” of the company – I detached myself form their operation and began conducting the planned semi-structured interviews throughout the project. 
As the project has been constructed slowly over the course of four years between 2010 and 2014, in 2012 different villages had varying levels of engagement, so far, with the process. Some villages (stage 1) had been experiencing the project since 2010 and had seen most of what it had to offer. Stage 2 villages had been experiencing the project since 2011 and had seen the land cleared, the pivots and roads constructed, and the first sugar-cane planted, but nothing more. Stage 3 villages had been experiencing the project only in 2012 and had only begun seeing some land clearance and road construction. Stage 4 villages were still going through the land-lease process and had yet to finalize their agreements with the company, seen any work, or received any payments. And finally, stage 5 villages had been almost completely unaffected by the project in 2012, as a large piece of the land-lease area was still unplanned at that time. 
	As a result, by sampling two random villages from each of these five phased implementation areas I was able to control for the impacts of the process on local villages over time, and see differences in expectations and experiences among local people throughout the early life cycle of the project in particular villages. Together with a trusted interpreter I have known since 2008, who speaks English, Krio (the national lingua franca), and Temne (the local language), I traveled by Okada (a small motorcycle) throughout the project area throughout June and July, spending my days conducting four or five interviews in sampled villages, and trying to select an array of people within each village; men and women, elders and youth, landowners and strangers, the employed and unemployed. 
When this process was complete I added interviews in two additional villages which were of particular interest because of their unique locations in the project area and had collected a total of 55 interviews with local people from 12 different villages. Almost everyone I spoke to in these villages was Temne, a farmer, and illiterate. I conducted only three interviews in Krio (one with a man who had returned from many decades working in Freetown and two with young men from the Southern Mende region), and two in English (one with a local teacher and another with a man who had been educated in Freetown). All of the female interviewees identified themselves as either farmers, petty traders, or retired, had little or no formal education, had spent little, if any, time outside the area, and spoke only Temne.

Postwar Development and Gendered Disempowerment in Rural Sierra Leone
To many local people the great promise of the project was the opportunities it would provide. Men and women of all ages throughout the project area believed that the project would bring positive change. Elders reliant on their children and grandchildren for support, both male and female, hoped that their children would be employed and their future ensured. Adumu, for example, a 65 year old grandmother, said: “Well now I am old,” she said, “if the money for the land is paid high, my husband is able to give it to me and I will sit.” ‘To sit’ is used in Sierra Leone to mean relax or retire. Adumu continued later in the interview; “when they employ our children… he should be regular in the job for his parent to get what to eat.” The primary desire among elders, therefore, was for their security through land-lease payments and the employment of their children.
Unlike the elders, most of the young people, both male and female, hoped they themselves would be employed by the company, receive a regular salary, and be removed from the hard labor of subsistence agriculture. Alima, for example, a 35 year old mother of six in a stage 1 village who identified herself as a farmer and petty trader, said that to be employed by the company was their “only hope;” “when they said they employ the women, that was our only hope.” Alima had worked with the company for a while and lamented having been “seated.” Ekmatu, another woman in the same village, a 40 year old farmer and mother of 4, had also been hired by the company initially to clear the first pivots, but had then been “seated.” This, she said, had happened to many women; “before they employed them, but they’ve taken them out … they take us all out. Initially we were the first to weed, we weed the grass, but it’s been a long time.” Throughout my interviews I found few young women who did not want to work with the company. Indeed, in a stage 4 village Balay, a 40 year old mother of 2 who identified herself as a farmer said that “we see some of our companions were employed but in our village they have not yet reach us.” But when we asked her if she would want a job when the company arrived, she responded excitedly: “Me? I want.” 
We can see, therefore, that women were excited by the opportunities the company might bring. They felt that the payments and employment opportunities it would provide would benefit them. These expectations are in-line with those of their husbands, fathers, brothers and sons. However, in a number of ways women’s experiences of the project diverge significantly from those of their male relatives. I will discuss three interrelated issues which differentiate women’s experiences of the project from that of their male counterparts; 1) their exclusion from the initial decision regarding whether to accept or reject the project, 2) their exclusion from decisions about how to spend any cash benefits from the project, and 3) the compound disempowerment of women in a patriarchal system being subsumed into a capitalist global order.

Accepting or Rejecting the Project
It is worth noting first here that the decision to accept the project was, for the stage 1 villages, somewhat of a foregone conclusion. The project was championed by a member of parliament from that area and even male land-owners told me that they had no choice but to accept the project; it had been sent by Pa Earnest (The President) so anything the president accepts, they must also accept. Fobi, a 65 year old mother of thirteen said that “Ernest … brought them for us,” and Pa Lima, an 81 year old man who had returned to his village after years of working in Freetown stated; “the president told us before that he will bring companies that will help the country and they will give us jobs.”  In this way the project was initially seen as an extension of the president’s wishes and was not to be rejected by local people. As the project expanded however, villages did have the option to accept or reject the work of the project because village representatives had to acknowledge the land-lease (on paper) before the company could start their work. However, what my data shows is that women had no voice in such decisions.
	The original meetings between the company and the land-owners, for example, were attended largely only by men. As Tutu, an articulate but illiterate 25 year old mother of 1 in a stage 2 village told me, “the men are at the top, because we will have something to say, but no way.” When I asked her if she could go to such meetings she said “because I am a married woman, sometimes when I tell my husband, he will say no, you should not go, only him should go.” Similarly, Fatu, a 44 year old mother of 6, working as a farmer in a stage 5 village said that those meetings happened, but only “our husbands went,” and Adumu, the 65 year old grandmother quoted above simply said “well I did not go there.” When I asked her about these meetings, Balay, also quoted above stated “I never go there, no, only my husband went there.” 
	Partially as a result of this exclusion, women also had extremely little knowledge of the agreement itself. The first thing I asked every single interviewee was the very broad question “tell me what you know about the company, what are they doing here?” and among women the response was regularly a very simple statement such as “they said they would help us” or “they said they would employ our children.” Although the company requires that each village organize a representative committee to attend all project related meetings and relay the information back to the villages, and one member of that committee must be a woman, few women felt that this provided them any influence in the process. Fatu said that the women’s representative in her village did inform the women of what happens at these meetings – “when she listens … she come and tell us” – but felt that that representative had no power to influence the decisions of the other members of the committee. She said that; 
“even if you ask her, this is how she will answer, you the woman has no right to stand in front of the man. Whatsoever is good for him, because this farm that we are farming, they the men are holding the hoe. They do the work, we just follow behind.”
	Mabinty, a 35 year old farmer and mother of five who was one of the few women I spoke with who had any formal education – she had managed to finish primary school – told me; “well, now you are not the big man in the town and if the elder’s accepted, you that are behind just have to accept.” Kaday, a 55 year old farmer and mother of eight in a small village that was resisting pressure to accept the project still felt that she, as a woman, had no influence over this decision, arguing that “whatsoever they say we will accept it” because the decision is up to “the elders that own the town.”  As she said “I am not able to say it is right … I am not able to say it is not right.” In short, the women I interviewed throughout the project area had no voice in the decision to accept – or to reject – the lease agreement with the company. As previously articulated by Sewpaul (2005) and Izumi (1999), the supposed gender neutrality of the neoliberal marketplace served not to empower, but to reinforce the disempowerment of local women. 

If and How to Spend the Money
This difficult situation is only further compounded by the exclusion of women’s voices from decisions regarding the use of the money that enters the household as a result of the project. Even if we take the company’s claims at face value and accept that $3 million will be circulated annually within the local economy, we have to consider who has the power to influence the use of those funds, and the first important thing to realize is that the vast majority of those funds are controlled exclusively by men. There are two primary ways this happens.
	First, the majority of those employed by the company are men. While some women from the project area have been employed they have primarily only been involved in the initial land-clearing work and many report having been “seated” after only a few months of work. Alima, already quoted above, said that initially “they take men ... they take women,” but then all were sat and “when they take to make them work again, we the women they do not take us again … we the women, they take just two.” Ikmatu reported that in her village only two women were currently employed, compared to seven men. In another village, Balay lamented that “only our brothers are employed,” and said five men but no women were currently working with the company. As it stood in the summer of 2012, the majority of employees were men. Isatu, a 35 year old petty trader and mother of four living in a stage 1 village stated that “the men are more in number” and when I asked if they employ any women she simply said no.  
	The second major issue is with the distribution of both land-lease payments and the supplemental payments paid to landowning families annually for acknowledging the land-lease agreement. These payments are distributed at meetings at which three representatives of the recognized land-owning families in each village must sign – or thumb print – the relevant document before the company presents the village with a check. This check is then deposited in a bank in the regional headquarter town and can be accessed by those same signatories for the village collectively. What this means of course is that three individuals, all male heads of land-owning households, have collective control over the money intended to benefit an entire village. 
	The women of these villages, again uniformly, see themselves as powerless to make any decisions regarding these funds. When I asked her who decides how the money is used Finda, a 54 year old mother of two and wife of a land-owning man, stated that her husband “has hands there … any way they want to pass with it is the way they are going to pass with it. Where they go to collect it we are not present. Where they share it we are not present.” Adumu, whose husband is also a land-owner, similarly argued that although she knows the company says they will distribute money, “the payment they are paying I don’t know how much they are paying.” Alima claimed that “when they bring the money they will share it there,” but did not receive any of this money herself, and Warra, my youngest interviewee at 16 and still working on finishing elementary school class 6, said that; 
“even this our land, they have bought it, but our parents, they do not give them that money, his [the elder’s] own people are the ones he is giving the money. A few days ago the old man went and collects it from the bank, but they don’t give it.”
All told, women within the project area had neither a voice in the decisions regarding the acceptance of the company, nor any power to influence how the money being infused into the economy would be distributed or spent. Women are being marginalized, therefore, on multiple and compounding levels. They are marginalized from decisions regarding the acceptance or rejection of the company, in the hiring practices of the company, in the processes for the distribution of payments, and within the intra-village sharing of the money once it has been distributed by the company. These limitations on women’s influence, however, predate the arrival of the company. Indeed, they reify or compound existing dynamics of the prominent systems of patrimonialism and patriarchy that limit the rights and influence both of strangers and of women – who are always “strangers” – in northern Sierra Leone.

Patrimonialism, Patriarchy and the Disempowerment of “Stranger” Status
Mabinty was one of the most interesting interviewees to whom I spoke regarding the issue of gendered disempowerment. Much like the other women quoted above, she had no knowledge of how money would be spent, but, in addition, she made it clear that she did not feel that it was her place to have an opinion. When I asked what would be done with the money if and when the company started working on her village’s land, Mabinty said she did not know what it would be spent on, but if “the big ones agree, well [the company] is going to come” and they should make the decisions about how money should be spent because “they own the village” and “you that live in it, you just have to accept.” But when we described later in the interview the average pay that local people receive when working with the company, she was one of the few to say that she would turn down such a job – as she said: “I prefer to do mine that I have been doing. I am able to pull rice and sell.” She did, therefore, recognize the limitations of the project’s benefits, but nonetheless maintained her stance that the big men should decide what they want and, regardless of her own opinion, she should only follow. As she said: 
“if now I am the owner of the town, I am able to say no I don’t agree or yes I agree, they will follow me. But if the one that owns the town, be it bad or not bad, he agree, you just have to follow him.” 
This distinction, between “those who own the town” – the big men – and the rest (rooted in the patrimonial nature of customary land rights in Sierra Leone), maps directly onto the patriarchal pattern of gendered disempowerment that limits both the access women have to the process of decision making and their ability to control any of the economic benefits of the project. Fatu, a 44 year old mother of six living in a stage 5 village noted that: 
“we are women, you a married woman has no power … the man you follow him behind. They take you from your parents and bring you, is that not so? When they go and bring you, you meet the land, is that not so? So if you come and meet the land …what the man is happy for, you should be happy for that.”
Norsu too, a 24 year old farmer and mother of three, felt that this status, having entered a village through marriage, left women without influence in decision making because they have “just come for marriage.” This phenomenon is intrinsic to Sierra Leonean culture and traditions of land-tenure that marginalize anyone – the “strangers” – other than those who originally settled the village. Marianne C. Ferme notes the association in Sierra Leone between marriage, “stranger” status, and enslavement (2001: 84), while Rosalind Shaw has argued that married women in Sierra Leone have occupied an “ambivalent position” because they can never be “fully ‘in’ their husband’s households” (2002: 154), and, as she later describes, women “hold no land” specifically because they “have no town” (2002: 160). In short, the strict patrimonial system of land-ownership means that women, always “strangers” because only arriving in a village for the purpose of marriage, are largely subservient to their husbands and other male relatives. 
This subservience is marked, among my interviewees, by the regular resort to statements which abdicate responsibility to elder males who are seen to be either above or ahead. As Finda stated it “he who is above you … whatsoever he gives you, you will bear,” or as Fobi stated when talking about the lawyers hired by the company supposedly to represent the people in the village; “we are under them, because they are educated and they bring the jobs to us.” Similarly, Alima stated, “they that have the land know what they have to do … they are the ones that know more,” and Ekmatu said that “it is all left with them …whatever they bring us, we are not educated.” Tutu, the eloquent young lady already quoted above, put the issue perfectly, stating that “the rich man and the poor man are not the same. That is why we are just keeping quiet … there is no way unless we bear with the condition.” In many ways the women I interviewed for this project seem to have accepted this position; the majority of them do not question the legitimacy of male dominance. The dynamics of disempowerment found in customary society, however, are compounded by the liberal economic processes imported by the project; liberal market neutrality reinforcing existing marginalization. 

Conclusion 
Thirty years ago Safilios-Rothschild noted that in Sierra Leone the “sex stratification system permeates norms, values, and social structures” (1985: 299), and Chris Coulter has since argued that “in Northern Sierra Leone, a culture [exists] that promotes women's submission, servility, and willingness to endure and accept their subordinate position” (2008: 65). More recently Mackenzie noted, in work examining processes dealing (or failing to deal) with female former soldiers, that “the return to normal, the restoration of order, and reintegration” … “are not gender neutral but rather assume and require a particular gender order” which has the tendency to “inscribe and enforce exploitative and patriarchal forms of gendered order” (2012: 3, emphasis added). In this way, the supposedly gender-neutral processes of reintegration act, as she says, to “inscribe and enforce exploitative and patriarchal forms of gendered order” (2012: 3).  
By presenting qualitative data collected through an ethnographic approach, this article illustrates how this process of compound disempowerment is also one of the primary problems related to liberalized land acquisition processes in postwar Sierra Leone. Put bluntly, the gender-neutral, neoliberal model of development has reaffirmed and retrenched existing systems of gender disempowerment in Sierra Leone. Much as with other international interventions in transitional states, the points of “friction” (Tsing 2005) between imposed institutions and indigenous political, cultural, and social dynamics have generated unexpected – and in this case unfortunate – outcomes (AUTHOR 2013, 2014b, 2014c). We are left, therefore, to consider what exactly could be done differently. In the case of large-scale land-acquisitions, how can we avoid such disempowerment? Alternatively, how might women be empowered? 
The three actors many scholars, activists, and policy professionals look to for solutions to these problems are institutions; whether corporate (the company involved), governmental (the state), or legal (the institutions of international justice). However, there are dangers in relying on any of these parties to successfully protect the rights of women in weak or transitional states. Much attention has focused on codes of conduct and voluntary guidelines for corporate behavior (Borras and Franco 2010; Wisborg 2014). However, this case highlights the challenges even when companies commit to such mechanisms. The project analyzed here is not a worst case scenario. Quite to the contrary, it has been lauded as an example of “best practice”. It has signed on to more than a dozen different voluntary frameworks, is funded by 7 development banks which require bi-annual socio-economic impact assessments, includes a well staffed office for community sensitization, and has a long list of goals for improving education, employment, health, and social outcomes within the land-lease area. The problem is not in their commitment to these codes of conduct, but in their practical commitment and ability to implement them. 
The project described here is not staffed by individuals with any knowledge of gender dynamics, human rights, or local cultural norms. It is run by irrigation engineers, farmers, and construction foremen. They have very little knowledge - and perhaps even less interest – in gender relations in Sierra Leone and are largely ignorant of the local culture. Indeed, why would we expect otherwise? And we must ask ourselves, how can companies “empower” women or protect their rights if they have no understanding of local socio-cultural dynamics? As described above, their approach to “gender empowerment” was to require that one woman from each village sit on the representative committee; an institutional solution that helped no one. The key point is that even companies with the best of intentions will fail in their responsibility to protect women’s rights if they have no understanding of the complex social, cultural, economic and political milieu in which they interfere. 
It may make more sense then, as some authors suggest, to focus not on the corporations, but on the role of the state (Wolford et al. 2013; Verma 2014). It is the role of the state, after all, to protect citizen’s rights against infringement. However, and as noted above, in this case – and many others (Julia and White 2012: 1000; Githinji et al. 2014: 103; Ossome 2014: 163) – the itself state acts as a primary supporter and defender of the project in question. Indeed, in this case various parliamentarians, district politicians, and traditional chiefs have significant economic incentives to support the company, to the detrminent of marginalized village residents. I would term these state agents dissociated elites because they are, as I have reported elsewhere in reference to international interventions (AUTHOR 2010), leading lives largely dissociated from the experiences of the rural poor even within their own country. Agents of the state, therefore, often serve not to protect citizens, but to promote the corporation and protect the project.
Further, even if agents of the state wanted to enforce laws requiring more gender empowering practice, many states in sub-Saharan Africa they do not have the capacity to do so. “The vast gap between policy and law and their fair and effective implementation” (Verma 2014: 69), is partially, therefore, a result of the weakness of so many states in which such land-deals are occurring (De Schutter 2011: 264-265). In many countries the institutions of the state play only a marginal role, and this is particularly true in the isolated rural areas where many large land-acquisitions are occurring. Prior to the arrival of the company described here, for example, there were no paved roads, no electricity, no secondary schools, and no police stations with what is now the land-lease area. There is so little infrastructure in fact that 2 of my 12 sampled villages ca only be accessed by hiking a half hour into the bush and through paddy fields. In short, just as with the companies, the problem with relying on the state is that even when willing, enforcing laws and regulations is beyond the capacity of many of the states concerned.
It is perhaps for this reason that many scholars turn to the international legal mechanisms of justice and human rights. Verma, for example, calls for “a set of enforceable and binding international regulations and legal mechanisms” (2014: 69), while Claeys and Vanloqueren put great emphasis on the developing “right to food” (2013), and Wisborg enumerates clearly the various treaties and agreements that supposedly protect human rights to “food, home, paid work, property, political participation, gender equality, and racial equality” (2014: 35). But, unfortunately the problem lies with implementation. Wisborg himself notes that “those who are most directly affected by global processes of dispossession have the least power to defend ethical principles and human rights” (2014: 42), while Edelman et al. note that international legal instruments purported to protect such rights compete for primacy with those which protect free trade and agro-business interests (2013: 1524). But they key problem is that international law relies on the state for its enforcement. The state of Sierra Leone is signatory to various international legal mechanisms simply does not have the capacity – and perhaps not always the will – to enforce them on the ground. 
Considering these three problems, and setting them within the context of the global economic and political dynamics driving increasing interest in land acquisitions, we must realize that, at least for the time being, there are no simple institutional solutions to the disempowering influence of neo-liberal economic logic in interaction with already patriarchal indigenous social and cultural norms. But while the three problems noted above may have no easy solution, this case does provide a couple of very important lessons for moving forward. Simply being aware of both this compound disempowerment and the limitations of institution based approaches suggests particular necessary responses. 
First of all, such awareness demands that all actors, including companies but most importantly those with the power to control those companies such as development banks and bi-lateral funding agencies, be humble in their claims and constantly mindful of the potential negative impacts of the projects they propose or fund. All such funding organizations must realize that while economic liberalization and large-scale land acquisitions might contribute to peace and provide empowerment, livelihoods, and food security, they can also enflame conflict, be disempowering, and undermine livelihoods and food security. Funders, therefore, must be more humble in their claims and more conscious of potential negative repercussions.
Second, instead of relying on top-down solutions from these three institutional actors to empower and protect women, I suggest we begin to try to explore what women want that can help them defend their own rights; what would empower them to protect themselves? Behrman et al. remind us to consider alternative actors when the state itself lacks capacity (2012: 73), and I would hope that we could consider women themselves to be the first option. The very notion of human rights demands that individuals are universally worthy of both protection and participation, but our institutional focus often ignores the demands, desires, and capabilities of women themselves. Rights become not a reason for participation, but a reason for additional patriarchal protections. The first step to overcoming this limitation is for academics, civil society actors and development organizations to work with women, understand their perceptions and understandings of their own roles and actions within society and elicit from them their own ideas of how they can best defend their rights and privileges. Women themselves must be the agents of their own empowerment, facilitated by the skills and resources of the international community. New options are needed on the ground and only those who live there can say what those might be or how they might work.
And finally, in order to get to this point, a more fieldwork based and grassroots process of understanding local perceptions and experiences of land acquisitions is necessary. Locally led approaches to empower and protect the rights of women requires research that explores women’s experiences of such projects and mitigating any negative impacts of the current land-rush requires that we understanding not just the institutions involved or the individuals impacted, but also the complex social, cultural, political, economic and legal dynamics on the ground. From this point forward, therefore, academics, but also civil society and development actors, must participate in and support such research endeavors and commit to what will necessarily be more grounded research that will take more effort, more funding, and perhaps worst, more time (AUTHOR 2014a). 
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